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14 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSA

Deputy Assistant Director, OSA

SUBJECT

: Summary of OSA Activities for Week Ending

12 June 1963

#### 25X1A

#### PURCELL PANEL

and Land in Boston on 10 June to discuss the notes and recommendations from the Purcell Panel meetings which were held on 4 and 5 June. Dr. Purcell returned to Washington on 12 June to work on the Panel's report for the DCI.

### TAGBOARD

- 1. On 12 June the DD/R submitted a paper to the DDCI discussing in detail the background for Project TAGBOARD and the various steps leading up to the directive issued by the D/NRO on 4 June 1963 removing CIA from the management and technical monitoring role which had been delegated to it by the previous D/NRO on 17 October 1962. It is felt that CIA should continue to monitor this project and Dr. Scoville notes that the office of the DD/R will continue to function in the management and technical monitoring role as directed in Dr. Charyk's paper of 17 October 1962 until instructed otherwise by the DCI or DDCI. He suggests that the DCI attempt to reverse Dr. McMillan's decision to change the monitoring responsibility for this project.
- 2. Kelly Johnson has requested that the one-day technical review of Project TAGBOARD be held at Lockheed rather than in Washington on 19 June since he feels Lockheed can make a better presentation of the program status if they have access to the full-scale mockup and the

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	Marquardt facility. He noted that they will not have an engine installed in the Marquardt tunnel until mid-July, but he feels the group will be interested in seeing the facility itself.
25X1A	has been appointed as a member of the Configuration Control Board for ARGON by the Director of Program B, NRO.
25X1A	1. Five System IXA's including the prototype have already been delivered and are in use at the IDEALIST Detachments at Edwards and  The sixth system is due for delivery on 10 June. Deliveries will follow approximately one every ten days thereafter until a total of ten systems have been delivered.
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	OXCART
25X1A 25X1A	l. Earlier this week Lockheed suggested that the drag chutes used in the OXCART Program be inspected, repaired and repacked at Lockheed instead of returning the chutes to the since this would eliminate handling and shipping costs and would expedite repair of the chutes. Upon receiving this request, Headquarters investigated the possibility of repairing the chutes and found this to be a more feasible solution to the problem.
25X1A	2. Colonel Geary has requested that the Air Force Communications Service continue to flight check the Vavigation Aids as they have done in the past rather than have FAA assume this responsibility. After a thorough check into the latter possibility, the Air Force decided that it would be more economical for them to retain this responsibility.

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25X1A	3. Lockheed recommends that the recorder system be installed in the OXCART vehicles instead of one of the various
25X1A	other crash recorders that have been considered for use in the A-12's as a result of the 123 accident. They indicate that although the system will require considerable development, it will provide a more specialized type of information desirable for the A-12 operation.
	4. Aircraft #124 made two flights this week to obtain data to be used by the Accident Investigation Board in their study of the Aircraft 123 loss. The first flight was made to establish that sufficient pitch control was available to the pilot of Aircraft 123 to nose over and increase airspeed at any time when slowing down to 125 keas had he elected to do so. Tests on Aircraft 124 proved this conclusively. Other flight conditions such as climbing turns and descents simulating what the pilot reported he did prior to bailout were simulated on the second flight. This was done to prove that it was impossible to achieve the 1.05 mach reading he reported seeing on the triple display indicator using any power setting below the afterburner regime. This also was proven to the satisfaction of all concerned. Results of these tests were submitted to the Accident Investigation Board.
25X1A	5. Debriefing of the pilot of Aircraft 123, with the use of sodium amytal, revealed the following significant items of information:
	A. Verified that increase in mach number during the turn 25X1A to value of 1.05 began after initiated gradual climb to avoid going into cirrus clouds. This fact tends to confirm the Board's suspicion regarding plugging of pitot tube due to ice or other cause.
25X1A	Bdefinitely verified that indicated airspeed increased concurrent with increase in mach number and keas.  This fairly well establishes that both sides of the concurrent with the concurrent with sides.
25X1A	This fairly well establishes that both sides of pitot probe were plugged. This also rationalizes to a considerable degree judgment that an airspeed system error was causing his difficulty.

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C. Throughout the debriefing the questions of fuel flow and engine RPM were raised. It is evident from the responses that engine functioning was normal throughout and was not a factor.

The Accident Investigation Board is to reconvene on 11 June to review the results of this exercise, and hopefully proceedings and reports will be completed by the end of duty day 13 June.

- 6. As a result of the 123 accident the pocket for the packet of material carried by the OX pilots has been sewn on the inside of the right leg of the normal flight suit and on the inside of the leg on the outside coveralls of the space suit. It is now impossible for the packet to leave the pilot's body except by an explosion where his clothes are torn off.
- 7. Lockheed indicates that Hamilton-Standard's proposed delivery schedule for main and spike controls for the OX vehicles is totally unsatisfactory. They insist that the lack of these inlet controls is now so critical that the OXCART Program will grind to a halt except for those airplanes in which manual or fixed controls are being used, these are Articles 121, 122 and 124.

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(Sig

Chief, Programs Staff (Special Activities)

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